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Abstract 
 
The role of school fees in achieving both allocative and productive efficiency in the 
delivery of primary education has been a subject of intense debate. Building on a simple 
model that makes explicit the role of school fees in determining the optimal level of parental 
participation to school governance, this paper contributes to the debate by evaluating 
empirically the relationship between fees, participation and the accountability framework in 
public primary schools in Madagascar.  
 
The results show evidence that schools requiring parents to pay more fees 
experience a higher degree of parental participation. While results are consistent with the 
theoretical model, the empirical analysis provides evidence that school fees increase 
participation beyond their effect on the power relationship between the community and the 
school authorities. The model hypothesis that school fees modify the accountability 
framework, which leads to more productive participation efforts, is challenged by alternative 
explanations. One of them is that participation aims not to increase education quality but 
rather to decrease the amount of fees requested by the school. 
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1 Introduction
Education is widely considered a fundamental ingredient to economic growth and
building of sustainable institutions. As a step towards the completion of universal
primary education, many developing countries have abolished all school fees in gov-
ernment primary schools during the past two decades as a way to weaken the financial
barrier to access to education faced by the poorest. This policy has generally led to a
sharp increase in enrolment and attendance rates1. The relatively high price elasticity
of demand for education in developing countries has been confirmed by experimen-
tal evidence2. School fees and other direct costs of education appear to significantly
impede school participation.
Almost inevitably, however, the dramatic increase in enrolment levels has been ac-
companied by a general decline in the quality of education provided by the public
sector (Deininger, 2003; Bold et al., 2010). Three mechanisms linking the removal
of school fees with a reduction in the quality of education have been documented
in the literature (Bold et al., 2010): a change in the overall financial and human
resources available to public schools, a modification in the composition of children at-
tending public schools and a deterioration of the accountability relationship between
the community and the school authorities.
To compensate for the financial loss incurred by the reduction in parental contribu-
tions to their budget, public schools have generally received a yearly grant from their
central government. The change in the total amount of funding available to each
school is therefore of ambiguous sign. If the loss revenue from the collection of fees
is less than compensated by the increase in public funds transferred to the school,
total financial resources available to the school decline. The removal of school fees
also has an impact on the composition of students attending public schools. Families
whose decision to enrol their children is dependent on the removal of tuition fees are
either those who face the strongest financial constraints or those who value education
the least. Consequently, children who attend public schools as a direct result of the
abolition of user fees are likely to systematically differ from existing students in terms
of socio-economic background, age and ability. Additionally, better-off parents may
choose to remove their children from the public education system as a result of the
removal of school fees because they anticipate a reduction in the quality of education
(Bold et al., 2010). Lastly, the introduction of free primary education in government
schools can lead to a weakening of the accountability framework in those schools. In
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other words, the removal of fees may undermine the willingness and ability of parents
to monitor the school and participate in its management. While the first two mecha-
nisms have recently received a lot of attention in the literature, little is known beyond
anecdotal evidence about the role of the school accountability structure in explaining
the relation between school fees and education quality.
The main objective of this paper is to evaluate whether school fees influence the level
of parental participation in the management of the public primary schools via a mod-
ification of the school accountability framework. This paper relates to the literature
on the impact of pricing on product use. Paying for a service may give an additional
incentive for households to actually use the service. This psychological effect, often
referred to as the sunk cost fallacy (Thaler, 1980), induces higher attendance rates
for children whose parents had to pay for their education. It also means that parents
will be more willing to get involved in the governance of the school if they contribute
financially to its running. The payment itself screens out those who value the good
the least. This screening effect increases the efficiency of allocation, by concentrat-
ing take-up on those who attribute the highest value to education (Oster, 1995). Of
course, payment is also likely to screen out children who belong to the most finan-
cially constrained households, regardless of their valuation of education. Recent field
experiments have rejected the sunk cost fallacy hypothesis, thus ruling out the ex-
istence of a trade-off between efficiency (wastage in the absence of a payment) and
equity (greater access for underprivileged) in the provision of free products (Cohen
and Dupas, 2007; Shapiro et al., 2007).
However, as Bold et al. (2010) note, “maintaining efficiency without charging fees
may be more severe in the education context”. Some authors have advocated for
the maintaining of a certain form of payment from parents to the school as a way to
motivate providers and ensure sustainability (Kremer and Holla, 2009). Payment for
access to education likely matters for the strength of the accountability relationship
between providers and clients. Parents who pay school fees may be in a better position
to demand action from the school authorities in case the quality of education does not
meet the expected standards. In this sense, this paper also relates to the literature on
the determinants of community participation in the provision of quality schooling in
developing countries. Studies have shown that the success of programmes promoting
community participation as a tool to improve the quality of local public services is
highly context-dependent. Banerjee et al. (2010) found no impact of a campaign
aiming at promoting community participation in Indian schools by providing infor-
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mation and training. Bjorkman and Svensson (2009) found that an initiative aiming
at reinforcing community-based monitoring of local health service delivery in Uganda
resulted in a large improvement in both the quality and quantity of the service pro-
vided. To my knowledge, however, no studies have tried to explain and quantify the
role of fees on community involvement in school monitoring. This is the contribution
to this literature this paper is intending to make.
I propose a simple theoretical model that makes explicit the role of school fees in
determining the optimal level of parental participation to school governance and test
the predictions of the model on a cross-sectional data set of fifty-eight Madagascar
government primary schools. Although tuition fees have been officially removed in
Madagascar public primary schools3, some schools continue to ask parents for a con-
tribution at the beginning of the school year, often because they experience delays
in the reception of the government grant. Parents also continue to pay a non-trivial
amount to Parents Associations (FRAM4), notably to cover the costs of contractual
teachers. Substantial variation across schools in the amount of fees charged to parents
provides a suitable framework to empirically evaluate the relationships between fees,
participation and the school accountability framework.
I find evidence that evidence that schools requiring parents to pay more fees experi-
ence a higher degree of parental participation. While results are consistent with the
theoretical model, the empirical analysis provides evidence that school fees increase
participation beyond their effect on the power relationship between the community
and the school authorities. The model hypothesis that school fees modify the account-
ability framework, which leads to more productive participation efforts, is challenged
by alternative explanations. One of them is that participation aims not to increase
education quality but rather to decrease the amount of fees requested by the school.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the analytical framework;
Section 3 presents some background on Madagascar’s public primary education system
and describes the data; Section 4 presents the empirical results; and Section 5 discusses
the findings and concludes.
3
2 Analytical Framework
This model is based on a model proposed by Beasley and Huillery (2012) which
considers how parental participation to school functioning can determine the quality
of and demand for education. Parents decide on their level of participation based
on their expected benefits, which depend on the impact of their participation on the
quality of education, and on their expected costs.
I adapt this model to introduce school fees paid by parents to the school. The amount
of fees paid by parents contributes to determine the relative bargaining power of the
school community over decisions regarding the school. I also add a dimension of het-
erogeneity among parents in terms of real authority, or bargaining power, vis-a`-vis
school authorities. This enables me to capture relevant dynamics in parental partici-
pation at school level as well as develop predictions that can be tested empirically. The
model also reveals the main channels of impact of the level of school fees on parental
participation to school governance, namely a modification in the school accountability
framework and a change in the size and composition of the school community.
2.1 Model Setup
There are two groups of parents k ∈ {1, 2} within the school: the relatively powerless
(indexed 1) and the relatively powerful (indexed 2). Parents i are homogenous within
each group and have perfect information regarding the types and payoffs of all parents.
They do not coordinate their decision making. The participation effort of parent i of
group k is denoted ei,k; the total effort of other parents from the same group is denoted
e−i,k and the total effort of parents from the other group is denoted e−k. Parents
maximise their individual payoff by choosing their optimal level of participation effort
e∗i,k which equalizes their marginal benefits with their marginal costs of participation,
taking the effort of other parents as given (Nash equilibrium)5.
Benefits from participation depend on the impact of overall participation on school
quality and on the benefits parents gain from education6 (b > 0). School quality is a
function of the amount of participation from parents of both groups and of their level
of real authority, captured by the group-specific parameter θk > 0. This parameter
is itself a positive function of the level of school fees ω7: θ′k(ω) > 0,∀k ∈ {1, 2}.
Real authority of powerful parents is higher, regardless of the level of school fees
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(θ2(ω) > θ1(ω),∀ω ≥ 0). Participation costs are expressed as a function of the level
of participation ei,k.
The payoff Ui,k of parent i of group k is given by:
Ui,k(ei,k) = b q[ei,k, e−i,k, θk(ω), e−k, θ−k(ω)]− c(ei,k) (1)
With q[.] the school quality production function evaluated at the level of participation
effort of the school community and c(.) the participation cost function evaluated at
the individual level of participation effort. Parents do not derive any utility from
participation other than through the improvement in the quality of education. Efforts
made by powerful parents are more efficient in improving education quality (∂q
∂e
(θ2) >
∂q
∂e
(θ1),∀e > 0).
2.2 Impact of Fees on Optimal Participation
I further assume that the school quality production function has diminishing returns
to individual effort (q′(ei,k) > 0; q′′(ei,k) < 0) and that the participation cost function
is strictly convex in individual effort (c′(ei,k) > 0; c′′(ei,k) > 0). The first-order
conditions of the maximisation problem are, for all i and all k ∈ {1, 2}:
∂Ui,k(e
∗
i,k)
∂ei,k
= 0 =⇒ b ∂q
∂ei,k
[e∗i,k, e
∗
−i,k, θk(ω), e
∗
−k, θ−k(ω)]− c′(e∗i,k) = 0 (2)
Given the assumptions on the school quality production function and the participa-
tion cost function, a stationary point satisfying the above first-order conditions is
necessarily a maximum. Parents from the same group share the same characteristics:
θi,k = θk,∀k ∈ {1, 2}. Consequently, we obtain a symmetric equilibrium at the group
level: e∗i,k = e
∗
j,k = e
∗
k/nk,∀{i, j} ∈ k,∀k ∈ {1, 2} with nk > 0 the number of parents
in group k and e∗k the total level of effort from parents of group k, at equilibrium.
We are interested in the marginal impact of school fees on the optimal effort of parent
i of group k, which is given by the following total derivative:
d e∗i,k
dω
=
∂e∗i,k
∂ω
+
∂e∗i,k
∂e−i,k
d e∗−i,k
dω
+
∂e∗i,k
∂e−k
d e∗−k
dω
(3)
Parents belonging to the same group are identical in all respects, which implies that
the marginal effect of a change in school fees on the level of their optimal participation
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is the same. Formally, we can write
d e∗−i,k
dω
=
d e∗i,k
dω
(nk − 1). Using this equation to
simplify and rearrange equation (3), we obtain:
d e∗i,k
dω
=
∂e∗i,k
∂ω
+
∂e∗i,k
∂e−k
d e∗−k
dω
1− ∂e
∗
i,k
∂e−i,k
(nk − 1)
(4)
To find the sign of the partial derivatives in equation (4), I use the implicit function
theorem. Starting with the denominator:
∂e∗i,k
∂e−i,k
= −
∂2q
∂ei,k∂e−i,k
[e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k]
∂2q
∂e2i,k
[e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− 1
b
c′′(e∗i,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(5)
Using the symmetry of the Nash equilibrium within group k, which allows me to write
∂2q
∂ei,k∂e−i,k
= ∂
2q
∂e2i,k
, I find
∂e∗i,k
∂e−i,k
to be strictly negative, meaning that efforts from parents
belonging to the same group are necessarily substitutes.
∂e∗i,k
∂e−i,k
=
1
c′′(e∗i,k)
b ∂
2q
∂e2i,k
[e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
−1
< 0 (6)
With
∂e∗i,k
∂e−i,k
< 0 and nk > 0, the denominator of equation (4) is unambiguously positive.
Predicting the sign of the partial derivative
∂e∗i,k
∂ω
in the numerator of equation (4) re-
quires two more definitional assumptions and two simplifying assumptions:
1. ∂
2q
∂ei,k∂θk
> 0. A marginal increase in the real authority of group k has a positive
partial effect on the return to effort of parent i from group k (“authority”).
2. ∂
2q
∂ei,k∂θ−k
< 0. A marginal increase in the real authority of group −k has a neg-
ative partial effect on the efficiency of parent i from group k (“crowding out”).
3. d θk
dω
= d θ−k
dω
. A marginal change in the level of school fees has the same effect on
the real authority of both groups.
4. | ∂2q
∂ei,k∂θk
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k)| > | ∂
2q
∂ei,k∂θ−k
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k)|.
At equilibrium, the magnitude of the “authority” effect is higher than the mag-
nitude of the “crowding out” effect.
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∂e∗i,k
∂ω
= −
>0︷ ︸︸ ︷
∂2q
∂ei,k∂θk
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k)
d θk
dω
+
∂2q
∂ei,k∂θ−k
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k)
d θ−k
dω
∂2q
∂e2i,k
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− 1
b
c′′(e∗i,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0 (7)
The direct effect of a marginal increase in school fees on the optimal level of partici-
pation is positive for both groups. However, the fact that one group increases its level
of effort has further consequences for the optimal level of effort of the other group.
Formally, using the implicit function theorem:
∂e∗i,k
∂e−k
= −
∂2q
∂ei,k∂e−k
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k)
∂2q
∂e2i,k
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
− 1
b
c′′(e∗i,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(8)
Under the assumption that efforts between groups are not substitutes ( ∂
2q
∂ei,k∂e−k
≥ 0),
the total effect of an increase in fees on the optimal level of participation of both
groups is unambiguously positive (
de∗i,k
dω
> 0,∀k ∈ {1, 2}). Complementarity in efforts
is possible if participation from the two groups is different not only in efficiency, but
also in the type of actions undertaken8. If participation efforts between groups are
substitutes (as they are within groups), it is possible that only one group raises its
level of participation as the result of an increase in the level of school fees.
Whatever the level of substituability of efforts between groups, the level of generality
of the model does not allow us to draw definite conclusions on which group gains
the most in terms of participation from an increase in school fees. If the relatively
powerless group increases its effort level to a larger extent than the relatively powerful
group, the process of participation becomes more inclusive as the level of participation
of the relatively powerless group gets closer (albeit always smaller - see next subsec-
tion) to that of the relatively powerful group. If, however, the relatively powerful
group increases its effort level by more than the relatively powerless group, the par-
ticipation process becomes more elitist as the distance between the participation levels
of the two groups increases. In the case where efforts between groups are substitutes,
participation from the relatively powerless group may actually decrease.
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2.3 Impact of Fees on School Size and Composition
The change in the level of school fees also has an effect on the size and composition of
the school community. A rise in fees may induce some parents among the poorest to
remove their children from the school. Conversely, an increasing number of wealthier
parents from the local community, anticipating an improvement in the quality of
education, may choose the public primary school for their children. If wealth correlates
positively with real authority, which is reasonable since wealth is often a determinant
of social power, the number as well as proportion of powerless and powerful parents in
the school is altered by the change in fees. As equation (4) shows, the absolute number
of parents from both groups matters to determine the total effect of a change in fees
on their level of participation. The composition of the school (i.e. the proportion of
parents from each group) is also relevant for determining this effect empirically.
We know that, at equilibrium, for all i and all k ∈ {1, 2}:
∂q
∂ei,k
(e∗k, θk, e
∗
−k, θ−k) =
1
b
c′(e∗i,k) (9)
Since benefits from education b are the same for all parents, we have
q′(e∗1)
c′(e∗1)
=
q′(e∗2)
c′(e∗2)
and
e∗2 > e
∗
1, with e1 and e2 the individual level of effort of parents from powerless and
powerful groups, respectively. At equilibrium, the individual level of effort of relatively
powerful parents is strictly higher than that of relatively powerless parents9.
The expected participation effort of a randomly picked parent j is equal to:
E(e∗j) = e
∗
1(ω)(1− p(ω)) + e∗2(ω)p(ω) (10)
with p ∈ (0, 1) the probability that parent j is powerful (type 2). The impact of a
marginal change in school fees on the expected participation effort of parent j is:
dE(e∗j)
dω
=
d e∗2
dω
p+
d e∗1
dω
(1− p) + (e∗2 − e∗1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
d p
dω︸︷︷︸
>0
(11)
The last term of equation (11), which represents the composition effect, pushes up
the marginal effect of an increase in school fees on average participation. Because we
only observe parents who remain with the school, this composition effect makes fees
look more productive in fostering community participation than they are in reality.
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2.4 Discussion
The model predicts that an upward shift in fees increases the participation of at least
one group of parents, and possibly of both groups, depending among other variables
on the level of substituability in participation efforts between groups. The increase
in fees also changes the number of powerless and powerful parents in the school and,
ultimately, the optimal participation level of both groups. The shift in the composition
of the school towards powerful parents also increases average participation. These are
the predictions I will test empirically.
In this model, school fees influence the real authority of the community over school
officials. Fee-paying parents may have more power for several reasons. First, they
can threaten the school authorities with cancelling their contribution to the school
budget if their opinion is not sufficiently taken into consideration. School managers
are arguably more receptive of parental complaints and suggestions when parents
are in a position to withdraw their financial contributions, with potentially severe
budgetary repercussions for the school. Such financial concerns may be particularly
relevant when fees are used to pay the salary of contractual teachers10. Parents who
pay school fees may also have a stronger feeling of ownership over the school and
therefore expect a higher degree of accountability from school officials.
By shifting more power to the hands of parents, fees contribute to the raising of their
voice in the decision-making processes regarding the school. The enhanced ability of
parents to influence school authorities increases the efficiency of their participation.
All other things held equal, schools requesting parents to pay more fees are therefore
expected to experience a higher degree of parental involvement.
Parents participate to increase education quality. The model rules out other potential
mechanisms linking school fees to parental participation, including the possibility that
school fees give parents a direct incentive to increase their participation by increasing
their valuation of education (sunk cost fallacy hypothesis). The model also ignores the
fact that fees can directly raise the productivity of participation as schools charging a
higher level of fees have, ceteris paribus, more financial resources than those requiring
parents to pay less fees.
Whether the relationship between fees and participation works via a modification of
the school accountability framework will also be tested empirically.
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3 Institutional Background and Data
3.1 Institutional Background
Madagascar has an extensive network of primary schools. Under Didier Ratsiraka’s
first presidential term (1975-1993), the socialist government in power set a target of
providing each of the 11,000 Fokontany (the lowest administrative unit in Madagas-
car) with a public primary school (OECD, 2002). Despite several major political and
economic crises, the rule has survived through to today. Also, in response to dissatis-
faction with the quality of education provided by the public system, private primary
schooling has expanded steadily in recent years (Glick and Sahn, 2006). The avail-
ability of schools, both public and private, combined with a strong social demand for
education has produced relatively high enrolment rates to first grade. This favourable
feature of the education system is, however, undermined by a low retention rate in
subsequent grades and a high repetition rate (Lassibille and Tan, 2003).
In 2003, the public education sector has been subject to structural changes intended
to bring decision-making closer to the beneficiaries, and to give communities a greater
voice in the management and governance of the schools. These reforms have attributed
extensive responsibilities to local authorities at regional, district and school levels. Un-
der this new framework, public primary schools receive every year a capitation grant
from the central government to cover non-salary expenditures. This grant is managed
by a School Management Committee (FAF11), also responsible for the development of
the yearly School Development Plan. These committees are composed of school and
local officials, including the school head teacher, as well as parents’ representatives.
Every school in Madagascar also has a Parents Association (FRAM) responsible for
hiring and managing contractual teachers. FRAM representatives are elected by par-
ents during a general assembly held annually. Although tuition fees have been abol-
ished in public primary schools, FRAM are allowed to raise local contributions, mainly
to cover the salary of contractual teachers.
FAF and FRAM are the two formal channels through which parents can voice their
concerns and complaints to the school authorities. They are, therefore, the main
vectors of parental participation to school governance (Transparency International -
Initiative Madagascar, 2009).
10
3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data sources
Data come from three sources: (i) survey data collected as part of the Africa Edu-
cation Watch project, implemented by the NGO Transparency International in 2008,
(ii) administrative data collected by Madagascar’s Ministry of Education, and (iii)
commune census data from the Ilo programme of Cornell University.
Africa Education Watch was a three year (2007-2010) programme designed to assess
whether decentralised education management systems were effective in controlling and
preventing corruption and resource leakages. The programme covered seven countries
in Africa, including Madagascar. As part of the project, Transparency International
undertook, between March and May 2008, a large-scale assessment of the effectiveness
of decentralised accountability structures, quality of governance in schools and trans-
parency in the management of their resources. In Madagascar, sixty public primary
schools were randomly selected using a stratified sampling procedure12. In each school
surveyed, the head teacher, the head of the FRAM and twenty households randomly
selected from the school roster were interviewed. Respondents were asked about the
existence of mechanisms or channels to voice parents’ opinion and hold school man-
agement accountable; the use of these mechanisms by parents, their experiences with
and perceptions of corrupt practices in their primary school and the education system
and any other problems they identified (Transparency International, 2010).
Administrative data collected by Madagascar’s Ministry of Education complement
the Africa Education Watch survey with information on the number of students and
teachers for each surveyed school for the school year 2008-2009 as well as the total
number of schools in each commune13 surveyed by the Africa Education Watch pro-
gramme. A remoteness index of Madagascar’s communes from Ilo programme’s 2001
Census is used to test the validity of an instrument for the level of school fees.
3.2.2 Variables
Using those data, I construct indicators capturing the different elements of the model
of parental participation presented in the previous section. Due to data limitations,
the indicators generated do not always thoroughly cover the concepts they are sup-
posed to measure. Some other variables cover more than one aspect of the model.
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Participation to School Governance (ek)
This indicator provides a binary response y ∈ {0, 1}, with 1 meaning that the per-
son interviewed participates to the governance of their local school. The indicator is
made of seven components, with four referring to the respondent’s reported interest
in school governance and the remaining three to their basic knowledge of the account-
ability framework of the school14. The indicator codes 0 if the interviewee reported
no visit to the school in the last 12 months, is not a FRAM or a FAF member, did
not attend any FRAM or FAF meetings in the last 12 months, or reported having
no interest in school finances. The variable also codes 0 if the interviewee does not
possess the basic knowledge associated with any meaningful active participation to
school governance: knowledge of the yearly grant received from the central govern-
ment and knowledge of the two school accountability structures (FAF and FRAM)15.
Benefits from Education (b)
The model makes the simplifying assumption that households have only one child en-
rolled in the school. This is surely not the case for many households in practice. The
number of children attending the school impacts household’s benefits from improve-
ments in education quality. Having more than one child attending the school makes
participation more profitable relative to having only one child enrolled, as improve-
ments in the quality of education are assumed to impact equally all enrolled children16.
Efficiency of Participation
Efficiency of participation depends on the degree of real authority of the parent and
the household as well as on the strength of the school accountability framework, the
initial school quality and the total level of participation of other parents.
The social position of the survey respondent17 is proxied by the gender of the respon-
dent and a dummy variable coding 1 if the respondent is one of the two parents of
the children attending the school and 0 otherwise.
The social position of the household within the community is captured by its wealth
and the level of education of the survey respondent. Wealth reflects the social sta-
tus relative to the rest of the community, but also relative to the school managers.
Wealthier parents are therefore expected to have a stronger voice within the school
community. Household wealth is computed as the first component of a principal com-
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ponent analysis of eight durable goods possessed by the households18. Education is
another indicator of social status. It also reflects the capacity to perform certain
tasks, such as reviewing school records or understanding basic financial information,
skills that facilitate a meaningful involvement in the running of the school. Educated
parents are therefore expected to be more involved in the governance of the school.
The education variable is a dummy taking the value of 0 if the respondent did not
attend school or attended but did not complete primary school, and the value of 1 if
the respondent completed at least primary school.
The school accountability framework also contributes to determine the efficiency of
participation. If school officials are not responsive to parents, participation will hardly
have any significant impact on the way the school is managed. The strength of
the school accountability framework is captured by three different variables19, which
report the survey respondents’ level of agreement with the statements that (1) parents
can influence school decisions (influence), (2) complaints made by parents are taken
seriously by the school authorities (complaints), and that (3) it is easy to know exactly
how much resources are allocated to the primary school (transparency budget).
School fees are believed to modify the power relationship between parents and the
school authorities20. As discussed in the previous section, schools that require parents
to pay fees are arguably more prone to taking into consideration parents’ opinion
and complaints. This increases the efficiency of participation. It can be expected,
therefore, that school fees impact positively the level of parental participation.
Participation is likely to have a larger impact when the initial quality of education is
low. The initial level of school quality is measured by an index composed of a measure
of school infrastructure, the average class size, and an indicator of the number of
problems encountered by households the school year preceding the survey21.
The model starts from the basic assumption that participation from other parents
in the school is an input in the individual calculation of the level of participation
effort. It predicts that the number of parents from both the relatively powerless and
relatively powerful groups also affects the marginal impact of school fees on optimal
participation for all parents. Accordingly, I control for school size and composition in
my empirical specifications, with two variables: the number of parents from the same
educational group as the survey respondent and the number of parents belonging to
the opposite educational group22.
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Selection
As the model predicts, the size and composition of the school community may vary
according to the level of fees paid to the school. In order to prevent this selection
effect threatening the identification of the direct effect of school fees on parental
participation, one option is to include in the empirical specifications to estimate the
variables driving the selection, household wealth (ability to pay) in this case.
While the number of schools located in the surroundings of the surveyed schools
does not impact participation directly, it may affect the magnitude of the selection
effect. In communities where only one school is available, wealthy parents who value
education highly will keep their children in that school even if the school is free. In
the case alternative schooling options are available, those parents will be more likely
to remove their children from a free school to enrol them in a supposedly better fee-
charging (typically private) school23. The total number of public and private primary
schools in the commune of the surveyed schools will be used to determine the strength
of the selection effect.
3.2.3 Summary Statistics
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used to test the predictions of the
theoretical model.
Across the sample of 1,137 households for which the indicator of participation has
been computed24, 31 percent are classified as participating to the governance of the
public school. As Figure 3 shows, there is a large variability across districts and
schools in terms of the proportion of participating households. Participation appears
to be lower on average in the highlands and higher in coastal districts.
Data on payment of school fees (expressed in thousands of Ariary, the national cur-
rency) shows high heterogeneity across schools25. About 10 percent of schools do not
charge fees. On average, parents give 6,330 Ariary to their children’s school. They
pay 13,000 Ariary or more (about 8 US dollars26) in 20 percent of the schools. Figure
4 shows the disparity in the level of school fees across schools and districts.
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4 Empirical Strategy and Results
4.1 Empirical Strategy
We test empirically the implications of the model regarding the impact of fees S (set
at school level) on the level of parental participation in the running of their children’s
school, y∗. Although the level of effort y∗ is unobserved, we have a fairly precise idea
of what constitutes a minimum level of interest and knowledge expected from any
household who participates actively in the running of their school. The dependent
variable splits the sample of respondents into two groups according to this criterion.
The main specification that is being tested is the following:
y∗ijd = α + βSjd +Xijdγ + Zjdζ +Ddη + ijd
with ijd ∼ Normal(0, 1). yijd is determined by the following rule:
yijd = 1 if and only if y
∗
ijd > 0
yijd = 0 if and only if y
∗
ijd ≤ 0
with y∗ a latent variable for the level of participation of parent i in school j of district
d, Xijd a set of respondent and household-level covariates, Zjd a set of school-level
covariates, Dd a vector of district dummy variables, and α a constant term. This
probit model is estimated with maximum likelihood27.
I interpret the results in two ways, the first being the marginal effect of the model co-
variates on the probability that parents have a positive level of participation (P (y = 1|x))
and the second the marginal impact of those covariates on the level of participation
effort. The latter is given by the marginal effect of the independent variables on the
unobserved regressand of the latent variable model (E(y∗|x)), which can be interpreted
in this case as the level of participation effort.
4.2 Correlates of Participation
Estimates for the coefficients of the probit model are shown in Table 1. The distri-
bution of the predicted values of the latent variable model is presented in Figure 528.
Marginal effects (average partial effects) are reported in Table 2.
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Table 1: Regressions (coefficients)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 IV Model 4 CMP
school fees 0.028** 0.069** 0.074*** 0.055** 0.073** 0.292*** 0.289***
(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.10)
education (year≥6) 0.454*** 0.514*** 0.444*** 0.459*** 0.354*** 0.358***
(0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) (0.10)
nb children 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.136*** 0.138*** 0.085* 0.087*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
parent 0.390* 0.394* 0.424* 0.389* 0.342* 0.349*
(0.22) (0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20)
gender (male) 0.397*** 0.395*** 0.386*** 0.400*** 0.330*** 0.332***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
wealth 0.058† 0.057† 0.048 0.153† 0.034 0.035
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04)
school quality -0.195*** -0.197*** -0.167** -0.191*** -0.296*** -0.297***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)
nb parents same group -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.002** -0.002**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
nb parents other group -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
education*fees -0.009
(0.01)
influence -0.046 0.063 0.060
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
complaints -0.045 -0.035 -0.038
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
transparency budget 0.243*** 0.114† 0.120†
(0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
nb schools -0.006
(0.01)
nb schools*wealth -0.005
(0.00)
urban -0.465*** -0.465*** -0.449*** -0.486*** -0.598*** -0.601***
(0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
constant -0.680*** -1.490*** -1.525*** -1.754*** -1.386* -4.202*** -4.171***
(0.11) (0.55) (0.55) (0.62) (0.75) (1.07) (1.08)
district dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117
McKelvey’s R2 0.028 0.315 0.317 0.342 0.317 - -
† p<0.20, ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Results are coefficients.
Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses.
Table 2: Regressions (marginal effects)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 4 IV
school fees 0.010** 0.021** 0.022*** 0.016** 0.022** 0.080***
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
education (year≥6) 0.135*** 0.153*** 0.129*** 0.137*** 0.097***
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
nb children 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.023*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
parent 0.116* 0.117* 0.123* 0.116* 0.093*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
gender (male) 0.118*** 0.118*** 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.090***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
wealth 0.017† 0.017† 0.014 0.045† 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
school quality -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.049** -0.057*** -0.081***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
nb parents same group -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.001**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
nb parents other group -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
education*fees -
-
influence -0.013 0.017
(0.02) (0.02)
complaints -0.013 -0.010
(0.02) (0.01)
transparency budget 0.071*** 0.031†
(0.02) (0.02)
nb schools -0.002
(0.00)
nb schools*wealth -
-
urban -0.138*** -0.139*** -0.131*** -0.145*** -0.163***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
district dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117 1117
% 0 correctly predicted - 63 62 67 64 56
% 1 correctly predicted - 76 76 78 76 78
† p<0.20, ∗ p<0.10, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗∗∗ p<0.01
Results are marginal effects (average partial effects).
Robust standard errors computed using the Delta-method are reported in parentheses.
Marginal effects for interaction variables are reported in Figures 1 and 2.
The first column of Table 1 (Model 1) reports a bivariate regression of participation
on the level of school fees. It shows a positive and significant linear relationship
between school fees and parental participation. An increase of 6,000 Ariary in school
fees (about 2 US dollars), which is approximately equal to the mean and the standard
deviation of the distribution of fees across schools, increases the probability for parents
to be actively involved by approximately 6 percent29, on average. It produces a 0.16
standard deviation30 increase in the underlying latent variable y∗.
Model 2 includes controls for the various components of the utility function described
in Section 2. As expected, the number of household children attending a primary
school increases participation. Measures of real authority: gender (male), education,
and type of the respondent (parent vs. other household member) report results that
are consistent with an increase in the level of participation resulting from a higher effi-
ciency. Results confirm one prediction of the model which is that educated (relatively
powerful) parents participate more on average than less educated (relatively power-
less) parents31. Household wealth is not significant, however. This may be explained
by the fact, in this context, wealth captures both the social position of the household
within the community and part of the indirect costs of participation (cost opportu-
nity of time). As expected, the lower the initial quality of the school, the higher
the level of participation. Also in accordance with the theoretical model, an increase
in the number of parents from the respondent’s educational group reduces his opti-
mal participation level. The number of parents from the opposite educational group
does not appear to affect the chosen level of participation, which may indicate that
participation efforts from different groups are neither substitutes, nor complements32.
As a result of the inclusion of these additional covariates as well as district dummies33
and an additional urban/rural dummy variable, the marginal effect of the level of
school fees on participation increases sharply. The same increase of 6,000 Ariary in
school fees now increases the probability of positive participation by an average of 12
percent and the level of participation effort by 0.34 standard deviation.
Model 3 adds to the previous specification an interaction term between parental ed-
ucation and the level of school fees (see Figure 1 for average partial effects computed
following Norton et al. (2004)). The coefficient for the interaction term is statistically
insignificant at conventional levels. If we believe education to be a suitable proxy for
the level of real authority, these results provide evidence that the marginal effect of
school fees on the optimal level of participation is not systematically different for rel-
18
atively powerless (uneducated) and relatively powerful (educated) parents. Any rise
in school fees will generate an increase in participation from all types of parents of
about the same magnitude. Since relatively powerless parents start with a lower level
of participation on average, an increase in school fees benefits more to that category
of parents, in proportional terms. With the increase in fees, the share of participation
effort from the relatively powerless parents expands in the total of participation effort
produced by all parents.
The behaviour of school authorities matters to determine the efficiency of participa-
tion, and therefore its optimal level. Model 4 adds three indicators for the strength
of the school accountability framework. The inclusion of these three indicators re-
duces the magnitude of the coefficient for school fees. This suggests that part of the
effect of school fees on participation is channeled through the school accountability
framework. This result is consistent with our theoretical model. The effect is entirely
driven by a single variable which measures the level of transparency in the amount of
resources received by the school. If we believe our theoretical model to be an accurate
representation of the reality, this would mean that an increase in school fees translates
into more bargaining power for parents, which is used to force school authorities to be
more transparent in terms of the budget they manage. This improvement in account-
ability, reflected in the higher level of perceived transparency in schools charging more
fees34, increases the efficiency of participation and hence its optimal level. Surpris-
ingly, parental participation does not appear to increase with perceived ability from
parents to influence school decisions, or improvements in the way parents perceive
school authorities to deal with their complaints. Also, the coefficient for school fees
remains significantly positive after the inclusion of these additional variables measur-
ing the strenght of the accountability framework, meaning that school fees have an
impact on participation over and beyond a change in the power relationship between
the community and the school authorities. This important result and its implications
are discussed in the following section.
In Model 4, the residual effect of an increase of 6,000 Ariary in school fees on the level
of participation is 0.27 standard deviation. The McKelvey and Zavoina pseudo-R2 is
reported in Table 1 as a relevant goodness-of-fit measure for a linear latent variable
model. For Model 4, the pseudo-R2 is 0.34. The percentage of correct predictions is
reported in Table 2 as an alternative goodness-of-fit measure (for a threshold of 0.5).
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4.3 Selection
The model predicts that the positive correlation observed between school fees and
average parental participation may be partly driven by a selection effect that modifies
the optimal participation level of both groups as well as shifts the composition of the
school towards more powerful parents whose average participation is higher. Parents
whose children attend fee-paying schools are likely to be of higher social status (more
powerful) on average than their counterparts in free schools. Consequently, they
are expected to be more involved in school management. One possible solution to
this particular type of endogeneity problem is to control explicitly in the structural
equation for all relevant variables that drive the selection process. Household wealth
controls for this effect in our empirical specifications.
In our sample, the school average educational level of respondents is not correlated
with the amount in fees charged by the school. Pearson’s correlation coefficient be-
tween these two variables is not statistically significant (p-value=0.54). School fees
are also uncorrelated with average wealth (p-value=0.41). The level of school fees
is not a predictor of either school average education or wealth, when controlling for
locality (urban/rural) and districts in a linear regression.
As emphasised in the previous section, the number of schools located in the vicinity of
the surveyed schools may affect the strength of the selection effect. Model 5 includes a
variable for the number of primary schools in the surveyed schools’ communes as well
as an interaction term between this variable and household wealth, our control for the
selection effect. None of these two variables is statistically significant. Selection does
not appear to be a strong driver of the relationship between school fees and parental
participation35. This could mean that the price-elasticity of primary education is not
very large in Madagascar. Alternatively, the absence of sensitivity of the selection
effect with respect to the number of neighbouring schools may result from a poor
account of selection. If household wealth does not capture most of the selection effect
in the structural equation, endogeneity may still threaten the identification of the
impact of school fees on participation36.
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Marginal effects for interaction variables, computed following Norton et al. (2004):
Model 3: Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
education*fees Marginal effect 1117 0.0018072 0.0039229 -0.0093282 0.0065471
Standard error 1117 0.0048805 0.0013321 0.0005732 0.007475
Z-statistic 1117 0.54524 0.9387003 -2.759017 2.061419
Model 5: Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
nb schools*wealth Marginal effect 1117 -0.0015592 0.0005483 -0.0021607 -0.0000188
Standard error 1117 0.0013106 0.0004334 0.0000273 0.0020358
Z-statistic 1117 -1.172776 0.1320522 -1.761713 -0.6401837
Figure 1: Interaction effects and Z-statistics - Model 3
Figure 2: Interaction effects and Z-statistics - Model 5
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4.4 Endogeneity
The model says nothing about how the level of fees is set. If school fees are endoge-
nous in our empirical specifications in any ways, we may end up with inconsistent
estimates37. A possible solution is to find an instrument for the level of school fees.
One candidate instrument is the delay in the reception of the 2006-2007 school year
capitation grant from the central government, as reported by both the head teacher
and the person in charge of school finances (typically the head of the FAF). If a school
receives funds late in the year, school authorities will be more prone to ask for parental
contributions to ensure that the school can cover its running costs while waiting for
the grant to come through. The variable codes 0 (no delay reported), 0.5 (delay
reported by one respondent), or 1 (delay reported by both respondents). Statistics
are reported in Table 3. This variable is positively and significantly (p-value=0.01)
correlated with school fees (Pearson’s correlation coefficient of 0.33). While delays are
likely non-random, there is no significant correlation in the sample between delays and
distance from the district office, locality (urban/rural), remoteness of the commune,
tenure of the head teacher and total size of the school. This suggests that we can
reasonably consider delays in the reception of funds a valid instrument for school fees.
Specification 4 IV is estimated with a probit model with endogenous regressors, us-
ing maximum likelihood38. Table 1 reports the coefficients estimated for the latent
variable model. These results must be taken with caution as school fees, our po-
tentially endogenous variable, is not continuous. As Dong and Lewbel (2010) note,
“control function estimators are inconsistent when used with discrete endogenous re-
gressors”39. Acknowledging this shortcoming, the probit model can still provide a first
approximation that is easy to interpret in the framework of a latent variable model.
An alternative that is often prescribed in the case of a binary choice model with dis-
crete endogenous regressors, the conditional recursive mixed process estimator, gives
estimates very similar to the probit estimator. Estimations from the mixed process
estimator are reported in the last column of Table 1.
The instrument is statistically significant in the first-stage estimation of Model 4 IV (at
1 percent). A rise in the level of school fees of 6,000 Ariary increases the probability of
positive participation by 48 percent, on average. The coefficient is highly significant.
These results show that endogeneity is indeed an issue and that school fees most
likely have an effect on participation through channels other than a shift in the real
authority of parents relative to the school authorities.
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5 Conclusion
Parental participation in public primary school governance in Madagascar is respon-
sive to the amount of fees paid to the school. Participation increases with fees regard-
less of the initial degree of real authority. Results suggest that the composition of the
school does not change with the level of school fees and provide some evidence that fees
improve parental real authority. These conclusions are compatible with the predictions
of the model developed in this paper. However, the results also indicate that fees have
an impact on participation other than through a modification of the accountability
framework of the school. In other words, school fees do not appear to increase the level
of parental participation only by improving their authority over school management.
Different factors could explain these results. First, measurement error in the vari-
ables used to determine the state of the accountability framework may undermine the
identification of the channel through which school fees affect participation. It is also
possible that the selection effect generated by school fees is not well accounted for in
the structural equation. Third, fees could drive participation through other mecha-
nisms than an improvement of the school accountability framework. Parents could
participate because they value more education if they pay for the service (sunk cost
fallacy). Alternatively, fees may act as a signal for the quality of education parents
can anticipate from the school. For the same level of education quality, fee-paying
parents will have more incentives to participate because the potential of their school in
terms of quality improvement is relatively higher as those schools have more financial
resources. Lastly, parents could participate not to improve education quality but to
reduce the level of fees requested by the school. Those alternative explanations are
also compatible with the empirical results. A possible area for further research would
be to assess the relative importance of these different explanations to account for the
positive impact of school fees on parental participation to school governance.
Another possible follow-up to this research would be to explain the determinants un-
derlying the disparity in the level of fees across public schools in Madagascar. Also,
if further investigations confirm that school fees do increase parental participation,
determining whether this increase in participation leads to improvements in the qual-
ity of education provided by the public system would be of relevance for education
policy. If school fees increase education quality through community participation,
policy-makers need to take this element into account when designing a suitable policy
for the sharing of education costs between the beneficiaries and the State.
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Notes
1In Uganda, the number of children enrolled in primary schools nearly doubled between 1996
and 1997 as a result of the “Universal Primary Education” programme, which dispensed Ugandan
families to pay fees for primary enrolment (Deininger, 2003). Similar patterns have been observed
in Kenya and Tanzania (Glewwe and Zhao, 2005).
2Kremer (2003) for a review of randomised evaluations of educational programmes aiming at
increasing school participation.
3The introduction of the “Education for All” plan in Madagascar in 2003, which included among
other measures the abolishment of tuition fees in public primary schools, has contributed to increasing
the number of children attending a primary school by more than 50 percent: from 2.8 million in 2002-
2003 to 4.3 million in 2008-2009 (UNICEF, 2012).
4Fikambanan’ny Ray aman-drenin’ny Mpianatra in Malagasy (Transparency International - Ini-
tiative Madagascar, 2009).
5We obtain the classical free-rider problem in collective action. The parental participation level
determined as a decentralised equilibrium is less than socially optimal as parents tend to undervalue
the spillover benefits of their own effort on other parents (Banerjee et al., 2007).
6For simplicity, we assume in this model that parents have only one child in the school.
7See sub-section Discussion on page 9 for intuition.
8Complementarity in efforts between groups may arise through the resolution of an information
problem. School authorities may have an incentive to use a “divide-and-rule” strategy in the absence
of participation from both types of parents. It may also be the case that some powerful parents, on
average more educated that their powerless counterparts, need to create an accountability framework
(e.g. set up a Parent-Association, organise a meeting with the school head teacher) before other
parents can participate meaningfully. On the other hand, powerful parents, if they are relatively few
in the school, may not reach alone the “critical mass” needed to make school authorities accountable.
9Proof by contradiction. If e1 ≥ e2, then q
′(e2)
c′(e2)
> q
′(e1)
c′(e1)
. This proof makes use of our assumptions
on the school quality and participation cost functions as well as the fact that efforts of the powerful
group (type 2) are more productive (∂q∂e (θ2) >
∂q
∂e (θ1),∀e > 0).
10In Madagascar, a large proportion of school fees is used to pay contractual teachers hired by the
Parents Association. The remaining is usually spent for building construction and repair (Trans-
parency International - Initiative Madagascar, 2009).
11Fiombonan’Antoka amin’ny Fampandrosoana or Partnership for School Development (Trans-
parency International - Initiative Madagascar, 2009).
12Only 58 schools are included in the analysis due to a (random) coding error in the dataset.
13There are about 1,400 communes (kaominina) in Madagascar. The average population of a
commune was approximately 15,000 inhabitants in 2001 (Ilo census data, 2003).
24
14The reasoning behind dichotomising the dependent variable has two grounds. First, there is
no obvious way to weight the different components into a single, objective index of participation.
Second, the fact that respondents answer positively on some of the seven questions (e.g. a respondent
knows the school FRAM) does not contribute to raise their level of participation effort if, on the
other hand, the same respondents report no knowledge or interest in school governance on some of
the other components (e.g. the respondent has not been to the school in the last 12 months).
15Using responses from the head teacher and the head of the FRAM, it has been possible to
confirm that FAF and FRAM do exist in all surveyed schools, that at least one meeting of the FAF
or the FRAM had taken place within 12 months prior to the survey and that every sample school
did receive a capitation grant from the central government at the beginning of the school year.
16Note that the level of school fees is the same for every household within each school and therefore
does not depend on the number of children from the household that are enrolled in the school.
17The interview was conducted with the relative (e.g. father, mother, sister) who was following
the children’s schooling most closely (Transparency International, 2010).
18The goods are: house, land, livestock, vehicle, bicycle, radio, mobile phone, and television.
19These three variables share the same response scale, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree) with 1-point increments.
20It is worth noting that parents who pay a fee to the FRAM do not automatically become members
of the association. In fee-paying schools, the FRAM membership rate is 55 percent as compared to
35 percent in free schools. Tests on the sub-sample of fee-paying parents confirm that our mesure of
participation is not directly driven by the payment (e.g. parents visit the school because they come
to pay the fees). Also note that children whose parents are unable or unwilling to pay the school
fees are not allowed to attend classes.
21The index is the first component of a principal component analysis of those three elements.
22To construct these two variables, I first created a proxy for the number of parents in the school by
dividing the number of enrolled children with the average number of children per surveyed household,
making the implicit assumption that these households form a representative sample of their respective
school communities. In a second step, I used the proportion of respondents who completed primary
education (an indicator for real authority) to obtain proxies for the number of powerless and powerful
parents in the school. Lastly, I matched those proxies with the education dummy to determine, for
each respondent, the number of parents belonging to their group and to their opposite group.
23Alternatively, if parents can hire one of the school teachers to give private lessons to their
children (i.e. private tutoring), they may be more willing to keep them in the public school even
when alternatives are available. Meanwhile, their incentive to participate to improve overall school
quality will drop. Availability of private tutoring is not a significant variable in the specifications
tested and therefore has been omitted in the regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2.
24Nineteen interviewees were not asked about their interest in school finances and an additional
four did report having no child attending the primary school surveyed.
25In the case of one school, the amount reported by households was not consistent. This school
was therefore removed from subsequent analyses.
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26This represents a non-trivial amount in a country where the nominal GDP per capita was USD
412 in 2009 (IMF, 2012). Furthermore, households whose children attend a public school are generally
of a more disadvantaged background.
27Estimations from the logit model are very similar to the probit model. Results not reported.
28The probit model imposes two normalisation restrictions: the first on the threshold level of the
latent variable (y∗ > 0 if y = 1), the second on the standard deviation of the error term (σ = 1).
Consequently, coefficients do not have a concrete interpretation in units of measurement. Results
can, however, be compared between regressions for which the same restrictions apply.
29Because a change of one standard deviation in school fees is large, calculations based on marginal
effects are inherently imprecise.
30To obtain the effect of a change in school fees in terms of standard deviations of the latent
variable, I computed the variance of y∗ which is equal to the variance of the fitted values plus the
variance of the error term, set to 1 in the probit model.
31A Wald test indicates that the log-likelihood of both Model 2 and that of an unrestricted version
of Model 2 with interaction terms between all explanatory variables (except district and urban/rural
dummies) and the educational level of the respondent are not significantly different from one another
(p-value=0.35). This means that interactions terms are insignificant and carrying out this regression
on the entire sample is appropriate, at least with respect to the dimension of respondents’ education.
32Going back to the model, this translates in the term
∂e∗i,k
∂e−k
from equation 3 being likely null.
Alternatively, this result may indicate that the increase in participation resulting from the greater
number of parents in a group is exactly compensated by a reduction of the same amount of effort
from parents currently in the group, leaving the total amount of effort from this group unchanged.
33The sixty primary schools surveyed as part of the Africa Education Watch programme are
located in twelve randomly defined districts, with five schools per district. A Wald test rejects the
null hypothesis that district dummies are jointly insignificant at 1 percent in specifications 2 to 5.
34The Pearson’s correlation coefficient between school fees and perceived budget transparency is
0.1, with a significance level below 1 percent.
35As mentioned in footnote 23, availability of private tutoring does not affect participation, either
directly or via the marginal impact of wealth on participation.
36If the same amount of fees were to be charged to all parents whose children attend a primary
school in the same region, and with mandatory schooling, the magnitude of the selection effect would
drop. This general equilibrium effect makes it relevant to disentangle the effect of selection from the
other effects of fees on participation. Selection also raises important concerns regarding equity.
37We may have inconsistent estimates for other reasons that endogeneity, notably in the presence
of heteroscedasticity and non-normality of errors. This issue is discussed on page 31.
38The ivprobit command in Stata. Maximum likelihood is the default estimator.
39Our estimator also requires the instruments to be exogenous in the first stage equation and the
functional form of the first stage equation to be correctly specified.
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Figure 5: Distribution of fitted values (Kernel densities)
Table 3: Summary Statistics
N mean p25 p50 p75 sd min max range
participation 1137 0.31 0 0 1 0.46 0 1 {0,1}
school fees (in th. Ariary) 57 6.33 1.5 3.6 12 6.11 0 20 [0,-]
urban 58 0.62 0 1 1 0.49 0 1 {0,1}
education 1156 0.58 0 1 1 0.49 0 1 {0,1}
nb children 1156 2.23 1 2 3 1.17 1 9 [1,-]
parent 1156 0.94 1 1 1 0.24 0 1 {0,1}
gender (male) 1156 0.42 0 0 1 0.49 0 1 {0,1}
wealth 1156 0.00 -1.08 -0.22 1.11 1.39 -2.15 3.77 -
school quality 58 0.00 -0.56 -0.08 0.83 1.16 -3.58 2.28 -
nb parents same group 116 123.82 50.47 86.53 166.14 102.33 8.27 545.47 [0,-]
nb parents other group 116 123.82 50.47 86.53 166.14 102.33 8.27 545.47 [0,-]
influence 1156 3.89 4 4 4 0.75 1 5 [1,5]
complaints 1156 3.73 3 4 4 0.93 1 5 [1,5]
transparency budget 1156 3.25 2 3 4 1.06 1 5 [1,5]
nb schools 58 19.52 11 18 25 11.24 7 61 [0,-]
delay 58 0.74 0.5 1 1 0.33 0 1 [0,1]
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Model 1: Bivariate probit model with school fees (and a constant)
Model 2: Probit model with controls (except school accountability framework)
Model 3: Probit model with controls and an interaction between school fees and education
Model 4: Probit model with the entire set of controls
Model 5: Probit model with controls, number of schools and its interaction with wealth
Model 4 IV: Probit model with an endogenous regressor (school fees)
Model 4 CMP: Probit model with an endogenous regressor (school fees), estimated with a
mixed process estimator
In all regressions, the dependent variable is a binary measure of the level of parental
participation effort in the governance of the local public primary school. All estima-
tions take into account the possibility that observations within the same school are
correlated in some unknown way by clustering errors at school level.
As Freedman (2006) states: “The sandwich algorithm, under stringent regularity
conditions, yields variances for the MLE that are asymptotically correct even when
the specification - and hence the likelihood function - are incorrect. However, it is quite
another thing to ignore bias”. In the presence of heteroscedasticity, the MLE estimator
is generally inconsistent. A Wald test performed after a maximum-likelihood probit
estimation robust to multiplicative heteroscedasticity (hetprob command in Stata)
does not reject the null hypothesis of absence of heteroscedasticity (p-value=0.36) in
Model 4 when heteroscedasticity is suspected to affect the entire set of explanatory
variables (with the exception of urban/rural and district dummies).
The last regression of Table 1 is estimated with a mixed process estimator (cmp
command in Stata). The conditional recursive mixed process estimator offers more
flexibility than the probit estimator with continuous endogenous regressors (ivprobit
command in Stata). It can provide consistent estimates for the parameters of the
model even when the endogenous regressors are discrete variables (Roodman, 2011).
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